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Abstract  
This dissertation studies the similarity in voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties in the 
European Parliament. The study researches if the voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties in 
the European Parliament is more similar on eurosceptic issues than on other issues. In general 
euroscepticism refers to the opposition to European integration and the EU. This study looks 
at the voting cohesion of all eurosceptic parties, hard and soft, and right- and left-wing 
eurosceptic parties on the issues that form the core of euroscepticism compared to non-
eurosceptic issues. It turns out that the voting cohesion of all eurosceptic parties on issues that 
form the core of euroscepticism is not higher than the voting cohesion on other issues. 
However when group of eurosceptics is split into different groups the voting cohesion goes 
up. It is found that hard eurosceptics have a higher voting cohesion on issues related to 
euroscepticism than on other issues. The left and right eurosceptic parties have the highest 
increase of voting cohesion which shows the different motivations for their euroscepticism.  
Introduction  
Eurosceptic parties have been present in the European Parliament (EP) since the first term in 
1979 (Gabel & Hix, 2002, p. 951). The 2014 European Parliamentary elections have 
especially been good for the Eurosceptic parties. The presence of left and right eurosceptic 
parties in the EP has grown at these elections (Brack, 2015, p. 337). Several studies have been 
conducted on why these parties get elected and their party positions (Hobolt, Spoon & Tilly, 
2009; Treib, 2014; Kopecky & Muddle, 2002). Also some research has been conducted on 
their voting behaviour in the EP (Hix & Noury, 2009). The study of the voting behaviour of 
eurosceptic parties in the EP is important, because the parties can talk about different policies, 
but through voting they show which policies they are dedicated to (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, 
p. 62).   
Previous research has found that the populist parties Socialist Party (SP) (left wing) and Party 
for Freedom (PVV) (right wing) voted different on all issues in Parliament except on issues of 
supranational institutions (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, p. 60). Even though populism is a 
different concept from euroscepticism, both the SP and PVV are also denoted as eurosceptic 
parties (Startin & Krouwel, 2013, p. 82). This begs the question whether this voting behaviour 
of both left and right eurosceptic parties is also seen at the European level where decisions 
about European integration (supranational institutions) are even more pronounced. Following 
this my research question is: Is the voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties in the European 
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parliament more similar on issues which form the core of euroscepticism then on other 
issues?   
It is relevant to research the voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties, because euroscepticism is 
more prominent in Europe compared to previous years. It is scientifically relevant to study 
their voting behaviour, because not a whole lot of research has been conducted on it. Previous 
research has shown, by analysing MEP speeches in the EP, that the European integration- and 
national dimension  explains the (policy) positions of national parties in the EP better than the 
left/right dimension (Proksch & Slapin, 2009, p. 608). Even though the voting behaviour was 
not explicitly studied in Proksch and Slapin (2009) article, they do reflect the standpoints that 
(national) parties have in the EP which can have an influence on the voting behaviour. In 
other research, based on roll call votes till 2006, a left/right dimension and an anti/pro-
European dimension has been identified. Of these two dimensions it was found that the 
primary predictor for voting behaviour of members in the European Parliament (MEP) is the 
left/right dimension (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2006). The concept of euroscepticism however is 
not explicitly mentioned in reference to this dimension in the article. Also they have not used 
the data of the entire 6
th
 EP term (2004-2009). Considering that in 2007 two countries have 
joined the European Union (EU) it is important to look at the entire term. As is seen above the 
previous findings of Proksch & Slapin (2009) and Hix, Noury & Roland (2006) contradict 
each other. It is interesting that the anti/pro-European dimension is the most important 
dimension in speeches, but only a second dimension for explaining voting behaviour in the 
EP. In this study this issue will be discussed by testing if the voting behaviour of eurosceptic 
parties is actually explained by euroscepticism (European integration dimension) or not.   
In this study the voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties will be examined for the entire sixth 
term (2004-2009) to get the full picture. Despite the fact that there are fewer eurosceptic 
parties in the EP than in the current term (2014-2018), the sixth term will be examined. The 
reason behind this is that the data for that term and the term (2009-2014) was unfortunately 
not available. It will be looked at as a ‘least likely case’. If it is possible to identify a voting 
pattern of eurosceptic parties on eurosceptic issues in the EP in the sixth term then it is most 
likely that this pattern is also present in the current term.  
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Theoretical framework 
Conceptualisation and theory  
Euroscepticism is a concept that has been frequently discussed in literature (Taggart & 
Szczerbiak, 2002a; Kopecky & Muddle, 2002; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003). In general the 
term is used to refer to the opposition of European integration and of the EU. The concept 
Euroscepticism is considered to be ambiguous. On some instances it can mean either any 
objection to the advancement of European integration and on other instances it can refer to an 
ideological position that arranges the parties standpoints on other issues (De Vries & 
Edwards, 2009, p. 10). The core of euroscepticism is defined by Paul Taggart as:  
 ‘The idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). 
There are both right- and left-wing eurosceptic parties in the EP. It is found that most 
eurosceptic parties are either on the left or right side of the political spectrum; eurosceptic 
centrist parties on the other hand are not common (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002, p. 
985).This is the so called ‘horseshoe shaped or U-shaped relationship’. In general parties are 
structured in their party positions on issues on the left-right political spectrum. Parties on the 
left and right have different positions for example on economic, agricultural or environmental 
issues. Left wing (eurosceptic) parties are for income equality and right wing (eurosceptic) 
parties are for economic liberalism (Elsas & van der Brug, 2014, p. 195). Despite the 
differences on a lot of issues, eurosceptic parties do have one common feature which is their 
opposition to European integration. Voting issues that are related to the enlargement of the 
EU, European treaties and the transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational level will 
be issues which eurosceptic parties on the left and right agree on. For example both the 
French Communist party (PCF) (left) and Front National (FN) (right) were against the 
constitutional treaty, even though their policies differ on other issues (Gurfinkiel, 2005, p. 
40). Voting issues like the constitutional treaty form the core of euroscepticism, because it 
would ensure further integration, an extension of the competences of the EU and transfer of 
national sovereignty which eurosceptic parties do not want. On other voting issues the left-
right dimension comes back into play. Therefore we can deduce the following hypothesis:  
Hypotheses 1 (H1): Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament will vote more similar on 
issues which form the core of Euroscepticism than on other issues. 
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There is also another typology of Euroscepticism besides that of Taggart and Szczerbiak in 
the literature. In this typology there are four (ideal type) categories of party positions on 
Europe. These are Euroenthusiast (Europhile and EU-optimist), Eurosceptics (Europhile and 
EU-pessimist), Eurorejects (Europhobe and EU-pessimist) and Europragmatist (Europhobe 
and EU-optimist) (Kopecky & Muddle, 2002, p. 302). There are however a few problems 
with this typology. This typology is more complicated and precise then the typology of 
Taggart and Szczerbiak. As a result it becomes harder to correctly operationalize and classify 
the parties, because in order to categorize the parties a lot of detailed information on European 
integration issues in the policies of the parties will need to be present which is (usually) not 
provided (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003, p. 6). Also some parties, like the PSL and the Civic 
Platform, are lumped together in the Euroenthusiast category even though their stances on the 
EU were different (Neumayer, 2008, p. 7). The typology of Taggart and Szczerbiak will be 
used.  
Euroscepticism can be divided into ‘hard euroscepticism’ and ‘soft euroscepticism’. In theory 
hard euroscepticism is: ‘the principled objection to any economic or political integration’ 
(Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002a, p. 27). These hard eurosceptic parties are also against their 
countries membership of the EU. In practice hard euroscepticism is: ‘the principled objection 
to the current form of European integration in the EU’ (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002a, p. 27). 
They think that the EU contradicts their values. For example hard eurosceptic communist 
parties believe that the European integration is a capitalistic project. Soft eurosceptic parties 
on the other hand are not opposed to their countries membership of the EU. Soft 
euroscepticism is: ‘the contingent or qualified opposition to European integration’ (Taggart & 
Szczerbiak, 2002a, p. 27). This is shown through opposition of certain European (integration) 
policies or opposition when the path that the EU takes is, according to the soft eurosceptic 
parties, contradictory to the national interest of their country (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 
241). These differences between hard and soft euroscepticism leads to the expectation that 
hard and soft eurosceptic parties will show more voting cohesion as independent groups on 
eurosceptic issues. The hypothesis is formulated in hypothesis 2a.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2a): Hard and soft eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament will vote as 
independent groups more similar on issues which form the core of euroscepticism than all 
eurosceptics together 
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As already mentioned hard eurosceptic parties are against the membership of the EU and 
against any form of integration in the EU. Soft eurosceptic parties are not against the 
membership of the EU, but are against certain forms (policies) of European integration in the 
EU. Which form of integration soft eurosceptics are against differs from party to party. Hard 
eurosceptic parties on the other hand have less differences between their parties, in terms of 
European integration, because they are against the entire project of European integration 
which means there is no difference between parties about the kind of forms of European 
integration they are against. I therefore expect that hard eurosceptic parties will have a higher 
voting cohesion on issues which form the core of euroscepticism than the soft eurosceptic 
parties in the EP, which is formulated in the hypotheses 2b.  
Hypotheses 2 (H2b): Hard eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament will vote more 
similar on eurosceptic issues than soft eurosceptic parties.  
Apart from the distinction between hard and soft euroscepticism, one can also distinguish 
between left- and right-wing euroscepticism. Eurosceptic parties on the left are concerned 
about social-economic issues. European integration is characterized by neoliberalism which 
has, according to left eurosceptic parties, a negative effect on the welfare state of their 
(national) country (De Vries & Edwards, 2009, p. 8). This is why left eurosceptics are united 
in their opposition to neo liberal market policies. It sees the EU as a capitalistic project that 
serves the interest of the elite. The SP for example was against the constitutional treaty, 
because it would undermine the welfare state of the Netherlands (De Vries & Edwards, 2009, 
p. 9). Right wing eurosceptic parties want to preserve the autonomy of their country. They are 
opposed to further integration on the basis of cultural insecurity and see the ongoing 
integration policies of the EU as a threat to their national sovereignty. For example the Danish 
People’s Party (DPP) was opposed to the Amsterdam treaty, because it threatened their 
sovereignty and identity (De Vries & Edwards, 2009, p.9). Euroscepticism of right-wing 
parties is related to their tough stance on immigration and asylum. According to them their 
parties defend their community and culture against foreigners. This anti-immigration stance 
results for example in the opposition to the free movement of people in Europe. Therefore 
they are usually also opposed to further enlargement of the EU (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 
2002, p. 980). Due to the differences between left and right euroscepticism the following 
hypothesis is formulated:  
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): Right and left eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament will vote as 
independent groups more similar on issues which form the core of euroscepticism than all 
eurosceptics together.  
Data & Methods  
Data   
In order to study the relationship in the hypothesises the roll call vote data of the sixth term 
(2004-2009) will be used. The data of the roll call votes originated from Hix, Noury and 
Roland (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2009). Hix, Noury and Roland have grouped all roll call votes 
per policy area. Of these datasets about a hundred roll call votes are absent, but these only 
constitute 0.01 percent of all the votes. The advantage of using roll call votes is that it allows 
you to classify the MEPs in different groups (eurosceptic and non-eurosceptic, hard and soft 
eurosceptic, left and right eurosceptic), because all the names of the MEPs and which party 
they belong to are listed. It should be mentioned though that not all votes in the EP are roll 
call votes, but the number of roll call votes have increased over the years (Hix, Noury & 
Roland, 2005, p. 215).  
In this study the agreement index (dependent variable) has been calculated for all 
eurosceptics, non-eurosceptics, hard eurosceptics, soft eurosceptics, left eurosceptics and right 
eurosceptics (all independent variables) (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015). All these agreement 
indexes will be compared. Also the agreement index of these categories will be determined 
for all policy areas (independent variable) and compared. There is however a specific focus on 
the policy area constitutional affairs which will be discussed in the next section.   
Policy areas  
In this study all policy areas will be taken into account. In total there are 22 policy areas in the 
EP and are listed in the appendix. In the appendix and the analysis an extra policy area is 
created, because not all issues within the policy area constitutional affairs form the core of 
euroscepticism. Constitutional affairs (eurosceptic issues) is the policy area which will be 
looked at more closely, because it constitutes issues that form the core of euroscepticism. All 
other 21 policy areas are voting issues that are not related to euroscepticism (non-eurosceptic 
issues). Eurosceptic parties do not like supranational bodies and the EU is seen as a 
supranational institution. Constitutional affairs is a policy area which deals with EU treaties, 
expansion and organisational aspect of the EU (EuropaNu, 2016). Especially treaties creates a 
lot of buzz among eurosceptic parties. As mentioned before both left (SP) and right (DPP) 
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were opposed to EU treaties. The agreement index (voting cohesion) of eurosceptic parties on 
constitutional affairs will be compared to average agreement index of all other policy areas. It 
is expected that eurosceptic parties will have more voting cohesion on the issues of 
constitutional affairs then on other issues. In order to be certain that the entire policy area 
constitutional affairs contained voting issues about further European integration, a sample 
(40) of the voting issues was taken and examined specifically. It appeared that not all voting 
issues were directly related to European integration. Thereby some  voting issues have been 
excluded from this ‘eurosceptic’ policy area, because it dealt with the more technical issues 
within the European parliament or did not include further European integration. For example 
the voting issue of a motion of censure was excluded, because it had nothing to with further 
integration. This motion of censure was raised to ensure that Commission President José 
Barroso would appear for the plenary, because he received a gift from a billionaire 
businessman. I have coded all constitutional affairs voting issues to ensure that they are issues 
that are related to euroscepticism. The majority of the voting issues (329 of the 434) within 
the policy area constitutional affairs are issues that constitute the core of euroscepticism. 
Unfortunately I was not able to test for inter-coder reliability, because no one else has coded 
constitutional affairs for issues related to euroscepticism before.   
Eurosceptic parties selection  
In this analysis all parties that are used are identified by Taggart and Szczerbiak (1998, 2002a, 
2002b, 2008), De Vries and Edwards (2009). The parties that are being used can be found in 
table one and two (2004-2009). All parties in the EP that are not mentioned in the tables are 
considered to be non-eurosceptic parties. Euroscepticism can be divided into hard and soft 
euroscepticism, and right and left euroscepticism. It appears that there are more soft 
eurosceptic parties (25) than hard eurosceptic parties (15). This difference can be justified by 
the fact that there are simply less hard eurosceptic parties present in the EP. There are 19 right 
eurosceptic parties and 21 left eurosceptic parties. The parties that are identified in both tables 
have at least one or more seat in the EP during the sixth term (NSE, 2004). This is important 
considering in order that to investigate the voting behaviour or eurosceptic parties in the EP 
members of those parties need to have a seat in the EP in order to cast a vote.  
Several parties are excluded from the analysis, even though they are identified by Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, because only a faction of the party are (soft) eurosceptic. This occurs mostly in 
governing parties (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 1998b, p. 373). Overall these parties are not 
considered eurosceptic parties. If we take these into the analysis it can give a skewed image.  
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Table 1: Hard eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament (2004-2009)  
Country  Right  Left  
Belgium  Flemish Block  
Czech Republic  Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia 
Denmark  Danish People’s Party People’s Movement against the EU. 
June Movement  
Finland   Left Alliance  
France  National Front  Communist Party  
Greece   Communist Party 
Poland  League of Polish Families  Self Defence of the Republic of Poland  
Sweden   Green Party 
Left Party  
United Kingdom UK Independence Party  Greens  
     
Sources: Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002a; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002b (working paper); Taggart & 
Szczerbiak, 2008; De Vries & Edwards, 2009.                                                                                                                                                                                       
Table 2: Soft eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament (2004-2009)  
Country  Right  Left  
Austria  Freedom Party   
Cyprus   Progressive party for the working 
people 
Czech Republic Civic Democratic Party  
Denmark  Socialist People’s Party 
France  Movement for France   
Rally for France and 
Independence of Europe 
Germany   Party of Democratic Socialist 
Hungary  Hungarian Civic Alliance  
Ireland   Sinn Fein  
Italy  Northern League Party of Communist Refoundation  
National Alliance  
Latvia Conservative Union for 
Fatherland & Freedom 
 
Netherlands  Political reformed party + 
Christian Union  
 Socialist party  
Poland Law and Justice Party Polish peasant party 
Polish peasant party (Piast) 
Portugal   Communist Party  
Greens (Ecological) party  
Slovakia Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia 
 
United Kingdom  Conservative party Sinn Fein  
Scottish conservative party 
Democratic Unionist Party  
 
Sources: Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002a; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002b; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 
2008; De Vries & Edwards, 2009.                                                                                                                                                                                       
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Data analysis  
In order to study the hypotheses the roll call vote date will be statistically analysed by using 
the statistical programme IBM Statistics SPSS. The voting cohesion of eurosceptic parties is 
measured by using the Agreement Index:  
𝐴𝐼ᵢ =  
max{Yᵢ, Nᵢ, Aᵢ} − 1
2
 [(Yᵢ + Nᵢ + Aᵢ) − max {Yᵢ, Nᵢ, Aᵢ}]  
(Yᵢ + Nᵢ + Aᵢ)
   
Yᵢ means the number of yes or yea votes of group i. Nᵢ means the number of no or nay votes 
of group i and Aᵢ is the number of abstain voters of group i. Hereby the outcome of the 
Agreement Index (AI) will be 1 when all the MEPS of the group (for example eurosceptic 
parties) vote the same and will be 0 when MEPs of the group are even split between yes, no 
and abstain. For example if 60 MEPs vote and everybody votes no then the AI will be 1. If 
there are 60 MEPs who vote and 20 vote yes, 20 vote no and 20 vote abstain then the AI will 
be 0. Besides the AI there are also other ways to determine the voting cohesion. The Rice 
index (RI) has also been used to measure the voting cohesion. Here they measure the 
difference between all of the yes and no votes of the group which then is divided by the total 
of all no and yes votes. The disadvantage of this index is that it doesn’t take into account the 
third option that members of the EP have, namely abstain. The AI takes all three (yes, no, 
abstain) into account. There can be quite a difference between the outcome of the RI and AI. 
For example when 20 vote yes, 20 vote no and 200 abstain the RI will be (0.000) which 
means there is no cohesion. The AI on the other hand would measure it quite cohesive (0,750) 
(Hix, Noury & Roland, 2005, p. 215).  
We use the roll call vote data to determine the voting cohesion, according to the agreement 
index, of eurosceptic (hard and soft, right and left) and non-eurosceptic parties. To check if 
the differences between agreement indexes of the policy areas are significant the independent 
sample t-test will be used. This test can be used to compare two groups. In this research the 
first group is the policy area constitutional affairs, this forms the core of euroscepticism. The 
second group are the other policy areas who do not form the core of euroscepticism. This 
independent sample t-test is also used to determine if the difference between constitutional 
affairs and other specific policy areas are significant. The p-values of the 21 policy areas are 
listed in the table in the appendix. In order to test whether the difference on constitutional 
affairs is significant between hard and soft eurosceptics a paired sample t test is used. This 
test is also used for the difference between hard eurosceptics and all eurosceptics, as well as 
soft eurosceptics and all eurosceptics. Again this test is used for the difference between left 
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and all eurosceptics and right eurosceptics and all eurosceptics. For both these types 
(independent and paired) of t-test goes that there is a significant difference when the p-value 
is less than 0.05. 
First the voting cohesion of Eurosceptic parties as a whole will be measured and compared on 
constitutional affairs and other policy areas to test the first hypothesis. Second the cohesion of 
hard and soft eurosceptic parties as independent groups will be measured and compared to all 
eurosceptics on constitutional affairs to test the second (2a) hypothesis. Third the cohesion on 
constitutional affairs of hard and soft eurosceptics will be compared to test the second (2b) 
hypothesis. Fourth the voting cohesion of right and left eurosceptic parties as independent 
groups will be measured and compared to all eurosceptic parties on constitutional affairs to 
test the third hypothesis. Also the voting cohesion of non-eurosceptics will be measured on 
constitutional affairs and other policy areas to see how they compare to the eurosceptics, it 
also gives more insight into the voting behaviour of MEPs in the EP.  
Results 
In this analysis the agreement index mean of the policy area constitutional affairs (eurosceptic 
issues) is compared to the agreement index mean of all other policy areas (thus non-
eurosceptic issues). The results of the analysis are presented in table 3. The p-values indicates 
if the difference between the means of the agreement index of constitutional affairs and all 
other policy areas is statistically significant or not. Besides constitutional affairs (eurosceptic 
issues) there are 21 other policy areas. The agreement index mean of each specific policy area 
and the p-values are presented in the table in the appendix. The p-values in that table show if 
the difference between the agreement index mean of constitutional affairs and the other 
specific policy areas is significant or not. In order to determine the agreement index of the 
policy area constitutional affairs 329 voting issues were used. All other policy areas 
constituted 5863 voting issues. The specific number of voting issues used per policy area are 
presented in the appendix.  
To test the first hypothesis that eurosceptic parties in the EP will vote more similar on issues 
which form the core of euroscepticism than on other issues an independent samples t-test was 
used. This showed that the voting cohesion for eurosceptic parties, indicated by the agreement 
index, is lower on constitutional affairs than on the other policy areas. This difference is 
statistically significant. This means that the voting behaviour of eurosceptics in the EP is less 
in agreement over issues that are related to euroscepticism than on other issues. Therefore the 
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first hypothesis must be rejected. In fact the analysis has shown that non-eurosceptic parties 
have a higher voting cohesion on constitutional affairs (eurosceptic issues) than on all other 
voting issues. It is interesting that it is in fact the non-eurosceptic parties that vote more 
similar on issues which form the core of euroscepticism rather than eurosceptic parties 
considering that eurosceptic parties share similar attitudes to the European integration and the 
EU which would lead us to expect similar voting behaviour. However this is not the case and 
why this is will be discussed later in the discussion   
Table 3 
 CA                                  
Mean 
All other policy areas 
Mean  
p-values  
Eurosceptic parties 
 
 
0.449*** 
(0.010) 
0.476*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
Hard eurosceptic 
parties 
 
0.513*** 
(0.015) 
0.416*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
Soft eurosceptic 
parties 
 
0.516*** 
(0.011) 
0.577*** 
(0.003)  
0.000 
Left eurosceptic 
parties 
 
0.604*** 
(0.013) 
0.716*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
Right eurosceptic 
parties 
 
0.556** 
(0.013) 
0.589** 
(0.003) 
0.010 
Non-eurosceptic 
parties 
 
0.734*** 
(0.012) 
0.689*** 
(0.003)  
0.000 
number of voting 
issues (N) 
329 5863  
Abbreviations: CA.: Constitutional Affairs (eurosceptic issues). Standard errors are listed in the parentheses. 
Statistical significance levels:  *** P ≤ 0.001, ** P ≤ 0.01, * P ≤ 0.05.  
The eurosceptic parties can be categorized as either hard eurosceptic or soft eurosceptic. 
These parties will be analysed as independent groups for the second hypothesis (2a). In order 
to test the second hypothesis (2a) if hard eurosceptic parties and soft eurosceptic parties will 
vote more similar as independent groups on issues that form the core of euroscepticism than 
all eurosceptics together an independent sample T-test will be used. It appears that hard 
eurosceptic parties have a higher voting cohesion on constitutional affairs than all eurosceptic 
parties together. The difference between the agreement index of hard eurosceptics and all 
eurosceptic parties on constitutional affairs is statistically significant t (328) = 4.318, p< 0.05. 
This means that hard eurosceptics, in terms of voting behaviour, are more in agreement over 
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issues related to euroscepticism than all eurosceptic parties (hard and soft) together. The 
second hypothesis (2a) is thereby accepted for hard eurosceptic parties.  
Also it is found that the voting cohesion, indicated by the agreement index mean, of hard 
eurosceptic parties is higher on constitutional affairs than on all the other policy areas. The 
difference is between these agreement indexes significant. This means that hard eurosceptics 
are more in agreement over issues that form the core of euroscepticism than on other (non-
eurosceptic) issues. This shows that issues related to euroscepticism, like further European 
integration, are salient issues for hard eurosceptic parties. On average the voting cohesion for 
hard eurosceptics is lower on all other policy areas when it is compared to constitutional 
affairs. However on one policy area internal market & consumer protection the agreement 
index (M= 0.563, SE= 0.014) is higher than that of constitutional affairs (M=0.513, SE= 
0.015). This difference is significant t (586.386) = 2.477. This could be attributed to that the 
left/right divide plays a bigger role considering parties on the left are against economic 
liberalism and parties on the right are not.   
Soft eurosceptic parties in the EP have a higher voting cohesion on constitutional affairs than 
all eurosceptic parties together. This difference between the agreement indexes on 
constitutional affairs is significant t (328) = -8.658, p<0.05. The voting behaviour of soft 
eurosceptics is therefore more in agreement on issues that form the core of euroscepticism 
than all eurosceptics together. Therefore the second hypothesis (2a) can be adopted for soft 
eurosceptics. Besides that however the agreement index is lower on constitutional affairs 
(eurosceptic issues) than on all other policy areas. There is an opposite effect. The difference 
between the agreement indexes is statistically significant. This means that soft eurosceptics 
voting behaviour show less agreement on eurosceptic issues (constitutional affairs) than all 
other voting issues (non-eurosceptic issues).  
For the second hypothesis (2b) a paired sample t-test is used in order to test if hard 
eurosceptic parties vote more similar on eurosceptic issues than soft eurosceptic parties. It 
appears that the voting cohesion of hard eurosceptic parties on constitutional affairs is lower 
than that of soft eurosceptic parties. This difference is not significant t (328) = -0.139, p>0.05 
(0.899). Thus hard eurosceptics are less in agreement over eurosceptic issues than soft 
eurosceptics, who have a slightly higher agreement index. Despite the fact that the difference 
between hard and soft eurosceptics on eurosceptic issues is not significant the second 
hypothesis (2b) will be rejected, because hard eurosceptic parties do not have a higher 
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agreement index on constitutional affairs (eurosceptic issues) than soft eurosceptic parties. In 
order to accept the second hypothesis (2b) hard eurosceptic parties would need to have a 
higher agreement index with a significant difference which is not the case when we look at 
the results.  
Soft eurosceptics are more cohesive as a group on all voting issues (eurosceptic and non-
eurosceptic issues alike) overall when compared to hard eurosceptics. Despite that soft 
eurosceptics voting behaviour less in agreement over eurosceptic issues than non-eurosceptic 
issues. As already mentioned hard eurosceptics in contrast have a higher voting cohesion on 
eurosceptic issues than non-eurosceptic issues. This could be attributed to that hard 
eurosceptics are to a certain extend united by their opposition to European integration on 
eurosceptic issues. Whereas soft eurosceptics are more cohesive overall, but less united by 
their euroscepticism on eurosceptic issues (constitutional affairs) compared to non-
eurosceptic issues. 
There is also a distinction between left and right eurosceptic parties. To test the third 
hypothesis that states that left and right eurosceptic parties will vote as independent groups 
more similar on issues which form the core of euroscepticism, again an independent sample t-
test will be used. It showed that left eurosceptic parties have a higher voting cohesion on 
constitutional affairs than all eurosceptic (left and right) parties together. This difference is 
statistically significant  t (328) = -11.783, p<0.05. Thus left eurosceptic parties are more in 
agreement, in terms of voting, on issues that form the core of euroscepticism than all 
eurosceptic parties together. Therefore the third hypothesis can be adopted for the left 
eurosceptics in the EP. The agreement index for right eurosceptic parties is also higher on 
constitutional affairs than all eurosceptic parties together. This difference is statistically 
significant t (328) = -11.025, p<0.05. This means that right eurosceptics vote more similar on 
issues related to euroscepticism than all eurosceptic parties together. Therefore the third 
hypothesis is also confirmed for the right eurosceptics.  
Certain nuances have to be made however regarding the voting cohesion of right and left 
eurosceptic parties in the EP. Right eurosceptics do not have a higher voting cohesion on 
constitutional affairs than all other policy areas. This difference between the agreement 
indexes is significant. Therefore they are less in agreement on issues related to euroscepticism 
than on other issues. The agreement index of left eurosceptics is especially high for all the 
other policy areas (non-eurosceptic issues). It is even higher than that of non-eurosceptic 
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parties whose cohesion is usually higher on all voting issues (constitutional affairs and all 
other policy areas) than that of all the other eurosceptics (hard, soft, and right). Right 
eurosceptics also have a lower voting cohesion on constitutional affairs than all the other 
voting issues. The difference between these agreement indexes is significant. This means that 
the right eurosceptic parties voting behaviour is less in agreement over issues related to 
euroscepticism than issues non-related to euroscepticism.  
Discussion & conclusion 
In this thesis the voting behaviour on eurosceptic parties in the EP has been researched. It 
appeared that euroscepticism is not a driving force behind the voting behaviour of MEPs on 
European integration in the EP. Eurosceptic parties presented less voting cohesion on 
constitutional affairs (issues which form the core of euroscepticism) than on other policy 
areas (non-eurosceptic issues). What was expected for eurosceptic parties was in fact true for 
non-eurosceptic parties who showed more voting cohesion on constitutional affairs than on 
voting issues of other policy areas. A possible explanation behind this could be that non-
eurosceptic parties have more agenda setting power than eurosceptic parties through the 
allocation of reports. Through these reports rapporteurs have a lot of influence in the 
legislative process. Rapporteurs draft these reports on the upcoming legislation and negotiate 
with different political groups to get a high consensus among them. After this the report will 
be presented to the EP (Benedetto, 2005, p. 69). In order to pass the legislation a majority is 
needed in the EP. Considering that eurosceptic MEPs only form a small group in the EP it is 
not necessary for non-eurosceptic rapporteurs to negotiate and have a consensus with them. In 
turn by not negotiating a consensus between eurosceptic parties is not created as well, which 
can fracture the group. If this is the case for constitutional affairs (eurosceptic issues) it can 
result in a higher voting cohesion for non-eurosceptic parties on that policy area. Future 
research could investigate whether non-eurosceptic MEPs are allocated more reports on the 
policy area constitutional affairs then eurosceptic MEPs and if it has an influence on the 
fragmentation of eurosceptic voters in the EP.   
Another explanation is that pro-European parties (non-eurosceptic parties) are quite united on 
issues that concern the future of Europe. Any differences that could come up are solved by a 
consensus-style of policy making. Eurosceptic parties on the other hand are more a scattered 
bunch. They are against further European integration, however in various degrees. Some 
eurosceptic parties seek their countries withdrawal of the EU, whereas others want reform. 
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This is reflected in the results when the eurosceptic parties were split up in hard and soft 
euroscepticism. The agreement index on constitutional affairs went up for both hard and soft 
eurosceptic parties.   
In this research the voting behaviour of hard and soft eurosceptic parties were explicitly 
compared for the first time. Hard eurosceptics are against EU membership and any form of 
economic or political integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak, p. 27). It appeared that hard 
eurosceptics are more in agreement over issues related to euroscepticism than other voting 
issues (non-eurosceptic issues). This signifies that issues that form the core of euroscepticism 
unites them to a certain extent. For soft eurosceptic parties, who are against certain 
(integration) policies, it is the opposite where the voting cohesion is lower on eurosceptic 
issues (constitutional affairs) than on other issues (non-eurosceptic issues). This signifies that 
soft eurosceptics are not as united on issues related to euroscepticism compared to the other 
voting issues. However it should be mentioned that soft eurosceptics have a higher voting 
cohesion overall (constitutional affairs and all other policy areas) than hard eurosceptics. This 
means that hard eurosceptic parties are more of a fractured group overall than the soft 
eurosceptic parties.  
Eurosceptic parties show a lower cohesion on the policy area constitutional affairs compared 
to other policy areas even when they are independently classified and analysed on the left and 
right. Overall though the voting cohesion of both left and right eurosceptic parties has 
increased compared to all eurosceptic parties (left and right) together. The voting cohesion of 
left and right is also higher than the independent groups of hard and soft eurosceptics. Only 
non-eurosceptics have a higher cohesion. The increase in cohesion through the division 
between left and right shows the different motivations for their euroscepticism and their 
different aspects of objections against the EU. Eurosceptics on the left are opposed to the EU, 
because of its neoliberal character and they want to defend their welfare state. Eurosceptics on 
the right are opposed to European integration based on cultural concerns and feel that their 
national sovereignty is threatened by further European integration. This means that left 
eurosceptics are opposed to the current form of the EU and right eurosceptics are opposed to 
further European integration thus increasing powers (Van Elsas & Van der Brug, 2016, p. 2). 
The European integration dimension (or eurosceptic dimension) in general thereby is not as 
strong as the left/right dimension in explaining voting behaviour.  
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Appendix 
Policy areas:  
1. Agriculture (338 voting issues) 
2. Budget (415 voting issues) 
3. Budget Control (185 voting issues) 
4. Civil liberties, justice & home affairs (507 voting issues) 
5. Constitutional affairs (eurosceptic issues) (329 voting issues)  
6. Culture & education (135 voting issues) 
7. Development (89 voting issues) 
8. Economics (413 voting issues) 
9. Employment & social affairs (247 voting issues) 
10. Environment & public health (798 voting issues) 
11. Fisheries (147 voting issues) 
12. Foreign & security policy (784 voting issues) 
13. Gender equality (127 voting issues) 
14. Industry, research & energy (324 voting issues) 
15. Internal market & consumer protection (260 voting issues) 
16. Internal regulations of the European Parliament (13 voting issues) 
17. International trade (253 voting issues) 
18. Juridical affairs (162 voting issues) 
19. Petitions (26 voting issues) 
20. Regional development (158 voting issues) 
21. Transport & tourism (377 voting issues) 
22. Constitutional affairs (non-eurosceptic issues) (105 voting issues) 
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 Eurosceptic parties Hard eurosceptic 
parties 
Soft eurosceptic 
parties 
Left eurosceptic 
parties 
Right eurosceptic 
parties 
Non-eurosceptic 
parties  
 Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value 
Constitutional affairs 
eurosceptic issues 
0,4490  0,5132  0,5158  0,6035  0,5560  0,7343  
Agriculture 0,4633 0,351 0,4184 0,000 0,5231 0,668 0,6254 0,237 0,5096 0,008 0,6909 0,010 
Budget  0,4795 0,032 0,4216 0,000 0,5643 0,002 0,6945 0,000 0,5383 0,291 0,7373 0,859 
Budget control 0,4675 0,289 0,4364 0,000 0,5170 0,948 0,7870 0,000 0,4039 0,000 0,8237 0,000 
Civil liberties, justice 
& home affairs  
0,4327 0,218 0,3744 0,000 0,5090 0,635 0,7128 0,000 0,5433 0,466 0,6839 0,003 
Culture & education 0,4335 0,429 0,3615 0,000 0,5203 0,840 0,6364 0,172 0,4709 0,000 0,7572 0,346 
Development 0,5163 0,015 0,4091 0,000 0,6299 0,000 0,8217 0,000 0,5938 0,076 0,7324 0,948 
Economics 0,4417 0,588 0,4446 0,000 0,5439 0,057 0,6792 0,000 0,6106 0,001 0,6105 0,000 
Employment & social 
affairs 
0,4169 0,035 0,4076 0,000 0,5332 0,284 0,7752 0,000 0,6157 0,001 0,6333 0,000 
Environment & 
public health 
0,4918 0,001 0,4116 0,000 0,6057 0,000 0,7922 0,000 0,6203 0,000 0,6312 0,000 
Fisheries 0,5397 0,000 0,3932 0,000 0,6492 0,000 0,6241 0,387 0,6266 0,001 0,7497 0,465 
Foreign & security 
policy 
0,4937 0,000 0,4085 0,000 0,6000 0,000 0,6757 0,000 0,6140 0,000 0,6951 0,009 
Gender equality 0,4881 0,046 0,3971 0,000 0,5550 0,090 0,7883 0,000 0,5263 0,272 0,6491 0,002 
Industry, research & 
energy   
0,4860 0,009 0,3738 0,000 0,5994 0,000 0,6331 0,097 0,6447 0,000 0,6740 0,001 
Internal market & 
consumer protection 
0,4629 0,380 0,5632 0,015 0,5875 0,000 0,7892 0,000 0,6048 0,004 0,6636 0,000 
Internal regulations of 
the European 
Parliament 
0,3652 0,110 0,4035 0,154 0,4768 0,471 0,4278 0,009 0,4566 0,132 0,6371 0,255 
International Trade 0,4620 0,406 0,4394 0,000 0,6146 0,000 0,7744 0,000 0,6603 0,000 0,6859 0,014 
Juridical affairs 0,6340 0,000 0,4865 0,210 0,7462 0,000 0,7964 0,000 0,6316 0,000 0,8450 0,000 
Petitions  0,6330 0,000 0,4541 0,286 0,7214 0,000 0,8166 0,000 0,5873 0,512 0,7571 0,684 
Regional 
Development 
0,4734 0,129 0,3380 0,000 0,5904 0,000 0,6529 0,010 0,6491 0,000 0,7422 0,700 
Transport & tourism 0,4848 0,012 0,4062 0,000 0,5909 0,000 0,7400 0,000 0,6262 0,000 0,7014 0,053 
Constitutional affairs 
non-eurosceptic 
issues 
0,4176 0,164 0,4211 0,001 0,5001 0,550 0,5965 0,798 0,5105 0,093 0,7053 0,264 
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